| Two decades after Saigon
fell, Americans are still fighting the Vietnam
war. The Bosnia peacekeeping mission, Bill
Clinton's election, the Iran-Contra scandal, were
all affected by the continuing debate about
America's losing effort in Southeast Asia.
Unfortunately, as Adam Garfinkle's work makes
clear, the analogies that most liberals and
conservatives draw distort the historical record.
"It is easy to
confuse correlation with cause, especially if one
has been personally involved in the events under
analysis" (p. 6), Garfinkle warns in his
penetrating re-examination of the antiwar
movement. A resident scholar at the Foreign
Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia,
Garfinkle argues that the "great crescendo
of radical antiwar protest between 1965 and
1970" (p. 6) did not convince Americans to
oppose the war in Vietnam, nor did it convince
their government to withdraw. If anything, the
radical nature of the protests prolonged the war.
The antiwar movement became most influential
after the war, as politicians, journalists, and
scholars invoked the "sixties" to
indulge in "chestthumping or
breast-beating" (p. 221). The echoes of this
conflict continue to bedevil the United States,
Garfinkle believes, much as the imagined
poundings of a corpse under the floorboards
haunted the murderer in Edgar Alan Poe's 1843
short story, "The Tell-Tale Heart."
Garfinkle criticizes the
flood of self-justifying scholarly works that
"movement" graduates like Todd Gitlin
have produced. Garfinkle's is not a
"personal reflection" nor a definitive
history of the period. Rather, he offers "an
interpretation of a broad swath of interconnected
material" (p. xii). Based on secondary
sources, the book functions more as an extended
review article than a work of original research.
But what a marvelous review it is. Garfinkle has
a healthy, even overdeveloped, sense of irony,
and he relishes his central theme: that the
antiwar movement was so extreme it alienated
millions. Polls from the period suggest that the
linkage of the antiwar movement with broader
social movements distracted the protestors and
diminished their popularity. As a result, the
antiwar movement's biggest accomplishment during
the 1960s may have been electing the left's
archenemy Richard Nixon. More broadly, the New
Left helped destroy Franklin D. Roosevelt's New
Deal coalition between working-class Americans
and liberal elites.
The backlash the radicals
provoked was particularly unfortunate because it
wedded Americans to a failing strategy. Despite
conservatives' claims that the "liberal
media" and other dissenters undermined the
military effort in Vietnam, leaders in the White
House and the Pentagon seem to have done most of
the damage themselves. The Vietnam war was not
inherently unwinnable. Flawed policies doomed the
effort. In fact, Garfinkle argues, the United
States nearly defeated the Vietcong. The Tet
offensive in 1968 was perceived as a failure
despite America's military victory. As a result,
the United States failed to engage the North
Vietnamese regulars in the second, less difficult
war which ended with the fall of Saigon.
Opponents of the war failed to forge a broad
antiwar consensus partially because they were
distracted. Although the Vietnam war united the
movement, it did not cause the protests. The
protests reflected the "baby boomers"'
alienation from their "technetronic"
society (p. 3). A search for meaning amid
affluence propelled many students toward
proto-religious intellectual movements. The war
allied these searches for meaning with a deeper
tradition of pacifism and leftist dissent. The
result was a colorful, diffuse, contradictory,
and ultimately selfdestructive movement only
incidentally opposed to Vietnam.
Although the antiwar
movement failed to win its war against the war,
it succeeded in winning the "hearts and
minds" of a generation. Garfinkle shows how
the relatively fleeting and ineffectual antiwar
movement achieved a lasting impact on American
society by convincing millions that it had been
important. As the movement splintered, the myth
of success legitimized various intellectual
fragments including a new isolationism in foreign
policy, deconstructionism in the academy, and
feminism in the workplace and the home. The
result has been a country lacking in confidence,
in values, and in an ideological
"center" (p. 297).
The depth of Garfinkle's
argument about the origins of the antiwar
movement undercuts his assessment of the
collateral damage it caused. Movements like
feminism that emerged during the 1960s themselves
had deep roots. It is just as easy to exaggerate
the impact of the antiwar movement after the
1960s as it is to exaggerate the impact of the
movement during that tumultuous decade.
Clearly, the
"sixties" are badly in need of
historical re-evaluation. Young scholars less
invested in justifying their excesses will sift
through the many claims from the period.
Garfinkle has done yeoman's work in slaying so
many sacred cows while warning about contemporary
abuses of history. This stimulating, suggestive
book should foster the kind of balanced
historical interpretation of the 1960s the United
States desperately needs. McGill University
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