Beware simplistic historic analysis

Beware simplistic historic analysis Both sides claim victory in war of 1812 . Friendly countries work best when they appreciate their differences

The first year I taught at McGill University, I gave a course on American, er, United States, history from 1800 to 1876. A few weeks into the semester, when I plunged into my lecture about how Americans won the War of 1812, I sensed an uncomfortable silence among my students. Gradually, it became clear that my Canadian students had learned that they had won the War of 1812.

William Tetley's rather simplistic description of the war (Opinion, Nov. 28, "Bush could learn from War of 1812"and his attempt to use that description to clobber George Bush, reminded me of my welcome to Canada a decade ago.

In fact, the War of 1812, like all wars, was the result of various tensions and causes, calculations and miscalculations. The fundamental American motive was to stop the British navy's policy of impressing, or forcibly removing, seamen from American ships. Great Britain did not recognize the right of expatriation, that individuals could change their citizenships, and thus considered those sailors to be British subjects who had deserted.

The ability to change one's citizenship was essential to the United States, it being a nation of immigrants. Americans particularly hated what John Quincy Adams called "this authorized system of kidnapping upon the ocean," because it resurrected the bad feelings still lingering from America's successful revolution. Such bullying on the seas also offended Americans' republican ideals of free trade and vigorous commerce among nations.

As Americans debated these issues, and sought redress through embargoes and other peaceful means, a group of hotheaded "war hawks" were indeed calling for the liberation, er, invasion, of Canada. Just how central that group was in President James Madison's decision to go to war remains in dispute. What is not disputed is that while the invasion of Canada failed, Americans ended the war feeling victorious, viewing the War of 1812 victory as the final and successful chapter in the American Revolution.

History, we thus see, is multi-dimensional and complex. Just as we must be wary of monocausal historical explanations, so, too, we must be wary of promiscuous historical analogizing, broad claims trying to stuff the round peg of 2002 into the square hole of 1812. Tetley's attempt - along with so many Canadians' discussion of the possible war with Iraq - is also lacking in complexity and context. One must begin an assessment of America's war aims vis à vis Saddam Hussein with an analysis of the continuing feelings of American vulnerability in the wake of Sept. 11. Claims that a war against Iraq "would likely inflame the Muslim world and incite extremists and terrorists" are not likely to impress Americans, who over a year and a half ago suffered at the hands of already incited extremists and terrorists.

There is, of course, much room for disagreement over how America should prosecute its most justified war against these Islamicist terrorists and where Iraq fits into the broader picture, if at all. But we must be wary of a kind of Freudianism run amok that distorts this important debate, by a jump into speculative assessments about America's thirst for oil or George W.'s desire to finish his father's work, without first analyzing the considerable evidence staring us in the face.

There is a strange brittleness to the American-Canadian friendship. Many Canadians approach the United States with an automatic defensiveness and suspiciousness, which belies the neighbours' deep and dynamic cultural, political and commercial ties. Similarly, on issues regarding border-crossing and immigration policy, too many Canadians reach for purple language and polarizing prose. Like it or not, the American decision to scrutinize Canadians born in certain countries has to do with national origins, not race. Playing the race card, labeling the policy "racial profiling," inflames without clarifying. It creates a politically charged sideshow to the main event - and challenge - namely, how to balance civil liberties and real threats, the rights of all vs. the viciousness of a murderous minority, in Canada and the United States.

It is against this backdrop that comments about the president of the United States being a "moron" become so incendiary. People begin to wonder whether Chrétien's communications expert was truly caught in a classic political gaffe - a gaffe being defined as a politician caught in the act of saying what he or she really believes. And once again, Chrétien's laconic approach to the tensions allowed suspicions to fester.

The issue here is not whether the two countries will disagree, for that is inevitable, but how they disagree. Statesmanship, like friendship, cannot be a zero-sum ball game. In fact, diplomats and friends work best when they find common interests while appreciating each other's differences.

These days, when I lecture about the War of 1812, I call it "Why we think we won the War of 1812, why you think you won the War of 1812, and why we're both right." Canadians won by repelling the American invasion; Americans won by repudiating the British incursions on American sovereignty and pride. The lesson here is not only that history is complicated but that we can have win-win outcomes. This should be especially true for two strong, proud, and vital democracies, two countries bound together by so much that unites us and, we hope, mature enough to put those things that do divide us in proper perspective.